E 'as a known and accepted that the financial crisis originated in the banking system and spreading through the financial system has infected the entire world economy, causing a severe recession with loss of millions of jobs and huge costs to budgets public. Incidentally, the spending on the various government interventions in support of the banking system are estimated at about $ 14 trillion, or if you prefer in 25% of global GDP. (*) The causes of the crisis of the banking system have been identified the excessive use of securitization of subprime mortgages . (1)
Many commentators have wanted to see in an excessive deregulation of financial markets, the causes of the crisis called for more regulation. It 's true that the "shadow banking system", consisting of special purpose vehicles issuing bank specializing in the collection
(wholesale) of savings through the placement of structured credit products, toxic securities exchange on non-regulated financial markets (so-called over-the-counter , otc ), but can not be charged to the deregulation of the causes of the crisis, which should be sought rather deconsolidation of the rules agreed to universal banks. Incidentally, the expression shadow banking system denotes the mass of passivity 'hidden originate from the same banks, which does not appear in their balance sheets' cause deconsolidation, but that must be honored. The shadow financial system exchanges deregulated market securities representing the dark mass of the universal bank, that is so 'hidden behind a veil due to the willingness of regulatory authorities and other central banks' control systems that will' allow the deconsolidation. Part of this dark mass that abbruttisce the budgets of the banks, the crisis sub-prime mortgage and is' sound and turned into a bitter loss, and lying lifeless in the balance sheets of central banks around the globe, the illusory hope a day may resciuscitare to life, triggering storms currency. Party and 'was put in the pockets of families and businesses, who see coming off income, jobs and growth, in exchange for nothing. Party still haunts and hidden threat to the markets waiting to be placed in any fund or government budget at the expense of the taxpayer.
In truth ', all the financial markets, with the exception of the market "interbank", which is regulated unregulated, have worked well in an effective and efficient in pricing securities is atypical, both the banks' actions in smell of failure. In particular, equity markets have been very valuable to the banking system has effectively used them to make liquidity 'and honor the commitments. (2) This 'obviously caused a fall in prices of stock prices to the pressure of supply over demand, but this is' part of the game (3) . The non-regulated markets are were equally efficient in pricing securities linked to atypical securitization of sub-prime mortgages (so-called toxic assets), when the players have understood that incorporated most of waste paper in spite of extensive reviews of solvency '- then proved totally inadequate - awarded by the ratings agencies . (4)
The efficiency of the market in pricing the toxic assets has led to the immediacy, in a relation of cause and effect is the worsening crisis in the housing market for the disappearance of sub-loans first and the related demand for real estate, and the crisis of the monoline insurers . (5)
The only market failure and 'was - coincidentally - the "interbank" market in which banks participated in only by those who have liquidity' in excess of the planned application of money to lend to those who I'm short. However, the reasons for this failure - coincidentally - have not been charged with the deregulation, but rather information asymmetry that has' arisen between lenders and borrowers of money. In essence, the banks did not trust most 'of each other and did not lend money to each other as there is a shadow banking system (balance sheet) no one could distinguish solvent banks from insolvent ones. In this
context of families, in most cases, they continued to trust the banking system while it did not trust most 'of himself. In some cases there 'was run on the bank. Emblematic of the September 13, 2007 at the counters of British bank Northern Rock Bank (6) . The bank was saved only by an extraordinary intervention of the Bank of England and then nationalized.
the light of these considerations embitter the conclusions for Italy in which 'reached the 6 th Standing Committee of the Senate who points out the failure of deregulation of the markets.
The Commission (i) questions " on the validity 'of the principles on which stands the relationship between the rules and functioning of markets ," but without question' the validity 'of the principles governing the relationship between the rules and operation of banks and other financial intermediaries; (ii) does not challenge the " strategic sector" of the claim while the real economy had delivered on it, "a review worried about liability 'systemic'; (iii) calls inexplicably, on the one hand , which is assigned to the European Central Bank the power of politics "in terms of financial markets " after the exclusive currency, while the other complains:
- the "action weak supervision and lack of control mechanisms operate "
- phenomena of moral hazard, " misconduct and violation of fundamental ethical principles " not certain markets or savers;
- a dutiful " convinced and explicit reference to the entire banking system ... to focus on the protection of savings " and the " authorities 'supervision and control on the need' to make any further effort to ensure the full expectation that firms and investors have in the banking system "worth the continued loss of confidence and credibility ';
- the presence of a "shadow banking system " contrasted by the clear statement of the Governor of the Bank of Italy of the absence of such a system " based on the movement of toxic off-balance ";
- concern for (a) " the lack of transparency of bank balance sheets " (b) " violation of prudential regulations by banks in the use of derivative financial instruments " (c ) " definitely wait and see position of the authorities' supervisory such conduct" (d) "the unchallenged spreading financial products outside the budget "(e)" loss of credibility 'and expectations of the banking system "in relation" to funding and risk cover, charges borne by savers "
- an explicit reference to responsibility 'of directors and managers of banks " respect for ethical principles and ethics to the role .
In other words, saver if you jump into the fire you do not hurt !
All this then says a lot about the power acquired by the group interest of the banking system. This lobby and 'clearly able to subdue the politicians the most 'high standards. The Government in fact, rather than 'question a whole series of powers of the banking system - ranging from autonomy and independence of the central bank relating to the supervision of brokers, denied the liberalization of the credit market with the allocation of the reserve collection of savings among the public - what does', close the holes, it drops the trousers and plans to invest in new powers and prerogatives of those institutions have proved to technical competence, prestige, elevatura morale of his men, very unreliable for the task they had been confidently given to reduce the information asymmetry between households and businesses. It seems absurd
and disconcerting that when faced with a crisis caused by a banking system suffers from an excessive and dangerous concentration and gigantism uncontrolled and uncontrollable, are invoked more authorities 'independent supranational supervisory (7) with potential' anti-democratic and highly neo-corporatist (8) , instead of 'much more' democratically and legitimately reinstate obligations of specialization of the banking system to reduce the size of these intermediaries (**) and introducing factors such as market liberalization of the credit for the repeal the prohibition of the collection of savings from the public to eliminate the oligopoly in the banking sector, "pulverize" the offer and reducing systemic risk through the fractionation and distribution of credit risk within a larger number of competitors that are real banks, and thus without the possibility 'that the credit risk can be re-downloaded to savers. (8a)
A real decision-making autonomy of the political world should lead to conclusions diametrically opposed to those represented on the Commission, which aim to reward rather than to 'punish those who did wrong. Deserve more weight certain considerations by Consob (9) " The crisis in interbank lending, which provide cash flow 'required to ensure operability' of the banks and the refinancing of maturing positions, and 'cause pathological original Governments worldwide are faced with resolving the crisis and not just treat its symptoms and its degenerative effects . Consob so' and is' expressed in words but in fact also attacked the donkey where he wanted the boss and banned - without success - the selling (10) reasons for the choice "to limit speculation " certainly not to the detriment of savers when it was known that the banks had to sell shares to acquire liquidity '.
In support of the fact that the markets have functioned well in times of crisis and not its cause, it is reported as confirmed Consob, namely that " did not record abnormal conditions of the markets it 'much less situations of violation of norms and rules of conduct .
course, this was confirmed in early October 2008, and today?
Today markets are likely to be handled by the banking system due to the almost unlimited monetary resources available to central banks by a process called "unconventional" (so-called quantitative easing )***. Gia 'in the thirties, during the crisis of 1929, the reputation of investment banks and emblazoned' was significantly affected by behaviors that appear to involve the manipulation of the markets. (10) On the other hand, and 'known that the markets U.S. stock losses suffered in violent after an initial period of catching up to almost equal the initial losses, and then descend rapidly and inexorably well below the previous Minini. No one ensures that the initial recovery time before the final collapse was not the result of a manipulation.
The manipulation of financial markets by the banking system and 'a real risk. Some researchers believe the risk of manipulation of prices in real time when the banking intermediaries involved in the market as market makers in those programs sponsored by the companies 'management to increase market liquidity' of that market.
--- (*) cf. Banking on The State, Piergiorgio Alessandri & Andrew G. Haldane, Bank of England, Nov.2009, [ http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf ]
(**) And yet it moves! January 21, 2010, the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama announced regulatory measures to the banking sector likely to (i) introduce restrictions on the exercise of the activity 'bank ( limit the scope ) such as the prohibition to the exercise of activity ' trading owner, investing in hedge funds and private equity funds , (ii) introduce restrictions on market shares ( limit the size ) held by individual banks and financial institutions. The announced measures were based on the desire (s) to curb excessive risk-taking by banks and (ii) to protect the taxpayers from the cost saving from the budget, public financial enterprises "too big to fail" ( too big, to fail ). [ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e ] interactive graphics of the Law Reform banking and financial sector, passed by the Senate USA, July 2010 ( The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ) [cf. graphic reform http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.html? #% articleTabs 3Dinteractive ] [cf. Text reform http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf ]. A few days earlier, on January 16th, Obama announced a tax for the major banks such as to recover taxpayer funds spent to rescue the banking sector insolvency. "We want the Taxpayers' money back, and we're going to collect Every dime." [ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-vows-collect-every-dime-taxpayer-funds-helped-big-ba ]. The two
intent - allowing lobbies - seem to be welcomed, but there 'no Copernican revolution of the banking sector, which will' still rely on leverage and balance, or artifacts with very subjective evaluations and lack of transparency or worse physically loaded as in the case Lehman Brothers [See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/12lehman.html?hp , and 'the case to say: "Enron scandal , from this point of view, not' no good!]. The banks continue to operate in oligopoly by implementing non-profits to get old and still existing privileges, such as (i) Subject to the activities' of the collection of savings from the public and (ii) the credit ultimately borne by the taxpayer . Lam stringent accounting standards to give certainty to solidity 'and truthfulness' of bank balance sheets, lack of appropriate laws to liberalize and modernize the credit market, such as to allow - at least in part - of savings disintermediation of the banking system. These common-sense rules, however, could 'become unavoidable in the near future, when - to rein in galloping inflation, and both support business investment - the only prescription will be available' to make less efficient creation and movement of bank money, and while providing companies direct access to financial resources in excess of families, now reluctant to give their trust to a financial system in bancocentrico decoction. Under the rules, only short-sighted decision-makers and bureaucrats can think of renewing confidence in the banking system and perpetuate the moral hazard with the financial resources of the taxpayer.
(***) cf. Ben S. Bernanke, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 10 Feb. 2010, [ http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100210a.pdf ]. Worth noting is the statement (perhaps simplistic and rash) that the operations of floods of liquidity ', cd of quantitative easing "... did not impose costs on taxpayers, even those transactions ultimately likely to generate substantial returns for taxpayers ...". Sara 'interesting to see - the end of the day - the amount of these " ... ... Significant positive returns" as is "Taxpayers ... ... " I have benefited. Sara 'is also interesting to see how many of these significant benefits when taxpayers there will still be wearing the clothes of workers / entrepreneurs or savers / investors or consumers and thus which have been in the concrete results of economic policy and wealth redistribution carried out by Fed, with the declared and main aim of stabilizing the financial system.
(1) in the trade press, 'coined the term "toxic assets" to indicate a range of financial instruments atypical (atypical securities) that have become illiquid and are referred to the securitization of sub-prime mortgages exchanged on non-regulated markets (OTC, over-the-counter): Residential Mortgage-Backet Securities (RMBSs) asset Backet Commercial Paper (ABCP) Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDOs), Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). In particular, the CDSs are basically insurance on debt and have claimed to AIG - American Internationa Group substantial nationalization by the U.S. government.
(2) the Senate, Consultations, XVI Leg. No 29 March 2009 [ http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/209203.pdf ]
(3) a great opportunity for small investors, but certainly not was pleased to banks, so much so 'that are now shamelessly to claim under the aegis of the central bank, in addition to expertise in the monetary field, the competence in the field of financial markets. For math, financial markets are zero sum games in the sense that if someone earns +10, there is necessarily a party that loses -10, the sum and 'always 0. The clearing house, or Clearing House, are there to ensure that the game is always zero sum.
(4) agencies rating (three operators essentially divide the market Moody's , Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating ) are private entities on the basis of methods and evaluation models mathematicians not disclosed, provide assessments and estimates of the probability 'of the insolvency of the issuers of financial instruments. Obviously, the ratings agency ratings are not objective but precisely estimated, and hence the age-old question of conflict of interest between the agency and the applicant (and paying) the assessment of solvency '. This assessment should normally be inversely proportional to the risk of insolvency, according to a predetermined table. Some noted the anomaly of public importance that the rules of the law gives the private opinion of solvency '. The importance of public opinion can be found for example in the regulation of standard for pension funds (known as ERISA in the U.S. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employee_Retirement_Income_Security_Act , http://www.securitization .net / pdf / washing.pdf ), forced to invest in financial instruments with rating not below the cd investment grade, SO 'obligation that did not get a good opinion of solvency' can not join the portfolio of a pension fund. Conversely a bond that no longer has that view we should 'leave the portfolio. It 'obvious that the issuer has an interest that the assessment of solvency' that covers both the more 'high as possible as to the Rules of the best trial law expands the audience of potential buyers (and of course reduce the financial cost debt due to the estimation of a lower risk of default). Until the current crisis in the business rating agencies and is' right on the confidence of investors about the adequacy of the judgments in the future probably the single trust might not be enough and the rating agencies will be forced to give public faith about the adequacy of their judgments, with assumption of responsibility 'to investors. As for the incorrect assessment of risks by the market, this is not the result of asymmetric information but rather 'according to a special theory of Bini Smaghi (ECB) [cf. Reuters, 15/9/2010 http://it.finance.yahoo.com/notizie/ue-bini-smaghi-nuove-norme-bilancio-non-sufficienti-reuters_ids-32e994bc00ab.html ] are the markets that simply wrong to assess the risks. According to him, not 'because of the tricks of Greece (which has manipulated its accounts with the help of Goldman to enter the euro) if before the risk was underestimated Greece, not 'guilty of fraudulent securitization of banks made (with the ratings agency attributed triple A to junk) if the markets have underestimated the risks of securities linked to subprime mortgages, no information asymmetries, or worse, the bad and false financial information, they do overestimate or underestimate the risk that markets are wrong! And maybe there 'still some who doubt that central banks have lost credibility' or penalty.
(5) The insurance companies (mainly U.S., cf. Ambac Financial Group - AFG, according bond insurer in the world, ACA Capital Holdings was the first ) specialized in providing guarantees for repayment of principal and coupon bond based emissions. They ensure that is' the holder of the bond issuer's insolvency specific insurance contracts (Financial Guarantee Insurance - FGI).
(6) In the UK the previous case of a "bank run" ( bank run ) dates back to 1866.
(7) See Group Report [ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf ]. For the U.S., cf. proposals in the White Paper (white paper ) prepared by the White House (White House ) [ http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/pdf/nearfinaldraft_061709.pdf ].
(8) In Italy, a legal and historical example of corporatism 'that concerns the Charter of Labor approved by the Fascist Grand Council April 21, 1927, and published in the Official Gazette of April 30, 1927. It shall contain the signatures of the head of government, ministers, secretaries, of party leaders, presidents of professional federations of employers and workers. At that time, the Fascist Grand Council was not an organ of having held the power to adopt measures having the force of law like Parliament, but simply an organ of the party. In the United States and the reference 'to an Act of the New Deal , the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) estab' a National Recovery Administration (NRA) with the task of overseeing the drafting of rules on competition fair ". It was essentially a system of private economic planning ("industrial self-government"). In 1935, the NRA was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In this sense, the corporate law was born out of Deputies approved constitutional bodies of laws and regulations (legislative and regulatory requirements). The neo-corporate law has its sources in the adoption of legislation by the self-organ whose members are not democratically elected. For example, according to this approach in Italy can certainly identify themselves as neo-corporatist bodies, when they enact regulatory measures without proper parliamentary procedures: the Bank of Italy, Consob, Isvap, Antitrust, and all the Cnipa other authorities called 'independent fiscal agencies. Some politicians of today, like Franco Frattini called for - as in the past - the constitutionalization of the authorities 'independent to overcome doubts about the legitimate exercise of power shall' regulations. In fact, if the parliamentary passage resolves doubts from a objective point of view of the power delegated 'legislation (principle of legality'), more 'seems dubious investiture extra-constitutional body which has a subjective point of view and' called upon to act as regulatory functions (principle of legitimacy '), because strictly speaking only the Parliament, or any other constitutional body identified, and' entitled to perform legislative functions and regulations ( delegatus delegari non potest). [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delegata_potestas_non_potest_delegari ]. For more insights on the authorities' independent administrative, cf. House of Representatives, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Consultation on authorities' Independent administrative [ http://www.camera.it/459?shadow_organo_parlamentare=1494&eleindag=/_dati/leg16/lavori/stencomm/01/indag/indipendenti ]. The main problem that plagues this author 'is that in the same institution are added together the powers of an executive nature, regulatory and judicial review of entire economic sectors and important matters, without appropriate forms of control precisely because' the claimed independence. The extreme gravity 'of the situation may' be summarized in the words of Saccomanni, Bank of Italy, " activity 'of regulation, supervision and security in important sectors of the economy' was entrusted to public bodies unbiased ( ed. the authorities' independent directors), characterized by a high degree of technical competence and political parties at government [ http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/intaltri_mdir/Saccomanni_27_10_2010.pdf ]. It goes 'wonder if these bodies (extra-constitutional) that regulate, monitor and "guarantee" important sectors of the economy are not subject at government policies, who are subject? Here falls the ass! venturing answers, perhaps 'political direction of the Bank of Italy and' dictated by the owners of the shares or maybe from the roll of the dice? Perhaps the political direction of the Consob and 'dictated by the companies' listed? Or maybe the contemplation of the clouds? Perhaps the political direction of the anti-trust and 'dictated by multinationals? Or perhaps the home of Abbiategrasso? How can 'well understand, for Italy, and' constitutionally unacceptable that bodies that do not have democratic control of political powers and important for entire sectors of the economy and society ', which are not direct expression of activity' Government or MPs. Then on the 'high degree of technical competence , better draw a veil.
The U.S., on the subject we note the approval of the amendment sponsored by Ron Paul [ http://www.ronpaul.com/on-the-issues/audit-the-federal-reserve-hr- 1207 / ], Which removes restrictions on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the decisions of the U.S. Central Bank (FED), accused of putting in place without representation, not only monetary policy decisions, but decisions on fiscal and economic policy in violation the principle "no taxation without representation . (See Luigi Zingales, Il Sole 24 Ore, December 1, 2009).
For Italy, we highlight several attempts at reform, in a sense-democratic content of the Constitution providing for repeal or modify the existing art. 58. (See the so-called "draft Violante "
(8a) The solution 'per se' is simple, transparent and reasonable. It 'been taken over by people with extensive experience in the field as Paul Volcker (see cd The Volcker Rule), but not like the neo-corporatist system of large universal banks, with the top central banks. In Europe, for example, there is' no intention of applying the Rule Volcker [cf. La Repubblica, February 15 2010, http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2010/02/15/news/banche_no_della_ue_a_obama_non_in_linea_con_i_principi_del_mercato-2309581/ ]. In the U.S., but the debate and 'access. The alternative to Volcher Rule would be the so-called "macro-prudential" authority to be given a new 'independent created ad hoc , or the central bank [cf. Il Sole 24 Ore, 19 February 2010, http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/dossier/Italia/2009/commenti-sole-24-ore/19-febbraio-2010/controlli-binario-doppio.shtml? ]. The term comes from having split the unitary concept of monitoring the sound and prudent management of banks in two by-products or substitutes conceptual micro-prudential supervision and macro-prudential supervision. Obviously, the distinction has no meaning of honor. It 'a clever operation megamarketing [cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megamarketing ] for (a) already allow the 'neo-powerful banking corporation to acquire specific powers regarding the regulation of stock markets and their actors, too today for free and liberalized its interests in times of crisis and (b) to digest yet another rip-off man in the street, the buck 'on qualchun'altro their misdeeds. For the record, you can summarize and synthesize the following expressions: authorities' independent, universal bank, stock option , securitization or securitization, fair value or fair value , credit rating or , previous successes in the economy of fraud megamarketing innocent [cf. JK Galbraith, The Economy of the scam, 2004, http://books.google.it/books?id=FraCX-GLxFQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=galbraith&cd=8 onepage # v = & q = & f = false ]. For the rest of the debate, there 's only add that if you already today' governments do not have the authority ', as well as the will', to liquidate the large banking institutions and insurance companies are insolvent, it would be seriously worrying! Finally, it seems obvious that the purpose of macro-prudential and not 'to prevent the rescue from bankruptcy of large banks "interconnected" burdens on the budget state, since this would be sufficient to prevent the credit market liberalization by abolishing the reserve of activity 'in favor of banks to raise funds from the public and smaltellare central banks, as the crisis has definitely established that they are no longer 'able to perform the essential functions, which are: (i) control the money supply, (ii) to provide liquidity' insolvent institutions (lending of last resort), (iii) modify the discount rate in order to booms curb and prevent depressions (so-called speculative bubbles), (iv) assist and encourage the orderly economic development through the expansion of credit (see Clough - De Rosa). The real objective which is aimed at the macro-prudential 'instead of what not to miss the almost' total control by the neo-corporative banking, cash flows taking place within the "model of the circular flow of income" [cf. there Cap.2 - The crisis of capitalism and the model]. A brief digression with a "micro" concrete example can 'give the idea: in Italy there is a cd postal savings, a substantial cash flow (net 2008: € 14.5 billion.; Stock 2008: € 175.1 billion. ) and that 'brokered by the Cassa, with the help of post offices, to fund state and local authorities (municipalities, provinces and regions). The postal savings up to 2003, beyond the control of the banking system because 'collected by post and managed by the Fund DD.PP. public body in the form of government [cf. http://www.cassaddpp.it/cdp/Areagenerale/Chisiamo/Lanostrastoria/index.htm ]. In December 2003, the Fund DD.PP. and 'has been transformed into companies' stock (CDP SpA) and its social capital and' now held as to 70% by the Ministry of Finance and 30% by banking foundations, namely the banking system. Since then, the main exponents of the CDP SpA are obviously loyal men in the banking system and the apella of "postal savings " lurk in reality 'derivative financial instruments more and more' complex. Today, cash flow that is 'the part of the postal savings and' thus clearly outside the control of the banking system, despite its minority shareholding in spa (See Court of Auditors, the. 3 / 2010 of 26/2/2010, Rel 3.6, p. .38). Thus, the CDP SpA continues to collect monetary resources with explicit state guarantee, issuing complex financial derivatives under the name " postal savings" in this case and now also draw banks (€ 8 billion.) To finance companies [cf. http://www.cassaddpp.it/cdp/OperatoriFinanziari/SostegnoallePmi/index.htm ], then we'll see '! When you say Italian ingenio con innocent! [Cf. Report Court of Accounts 2007-2008 ].
Returning to the fear of loss of economic and political power of the banking system, this materializes in the expression hedge fund, and it 'was well illustrated by the ECB [cf. Bini Smaghi, January 21 2010, Milan, paragraph 3, http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100129.it.html ]. Pultroppo in authoritative intervention to justify the indefensible his pro domo, you 'exclusive reference to "interconnections" between financial no distinction is essential and not trivial, and that means' to who weigh losses Financial Crisis. No decision-maker, after the LTCM case in which the Bank of Italy lost USD 100 million [cf. http://riskinstitute.ch/146520.htm ], would dream of charging the state budget losses of a fund for private investment (hedge fund ). Otherwise, the failure of a universal bank that provides financial losses not only own, but a large part of depositors (savers cd unconscious) forces governments to intervene out of the public debt, worth the revolution! But on the other hand, it would be naïve to expect that members of agencies to ensure sound and prudent management of banking institutions attribute to themselves the responsibility 'of the colossal failure of the banking system still active against all the rules of morality, much better to blame non-supervised and some 'unknown to the mass, such as hedge funds , otherwise you should admit its uselessness' or at least their own inadequacy in fulfilling assigned functions, and this bitter truth 'would also lead to negative political consequences, since the responsibility for' Last of a banking system based on fraud and ill-thought, ultimately weighing on the heads of governments [cf. http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Mondo/2010/03/francia-regionali-sinistra.shtml? ]. The governor of the Bank of Italy (see Il Sole 24 Ore, 16 September 2010) after substantially admitted (first point) the failure of central banks to assess and control risk and (second point) their inability 'to control those banks (transnational), however, that he himself helped to create in Italy, with incentives of any kind, feels compelled to ask (without shame) is to "strengthen the mandate , independence, resources and methods of oversight bodies ", and " included in the scope of the sources of legal risk to the existing system outside them. " In essence, Draghi, central banks and other authorities' independent economic-financial - despite the overt failure of their mission - not just should not see questioned their role as authorities' self, but should have more 'power, more' money, more 'for more independence and' should have a greater audience of people subjected to their control. The trick of megamarketing this time is called "shadow banking system . As if this system was not organized and existing staff at banks, but something external and indecipherable to be brought under control. It is clear that the expression shadow banking system denotes that part of the liabilities' (more 'than activity') of the same bank that does not appear in their balance sheets and that is hidden behind a veil with complacency central banks and other authorities 'independent, what it' guide in a large neo-corporate family (where the rules if they sing and if they play at will), and where there is careful not to discuss the liberalization of credit market to increase competition and decrease the diameter of the holes left by the failures of universal banks. In fact, better to do the opposite with a little 'of lobbying governments to encourage them to approve rules that aim to introduce further barriers to entry can greatly reduce the number of people in the market. For people like Dragons and 'urgent need to strengthen the oligopoly of the guild of bankers SO' this will continue (due to the crisis) to gain more ' had in other areas of non-core to bring in house - adjacent to the activities 'of the bank (collection of savings from the public and the provision of credit) - as the activities' of the grant funding, the provision of payment services, financial advice, mediation, financing, etc.. (Cf. Leg. 141/2010) to too many hours to ensure free, according to them, the protection of the consumer. "More 'bank with petroleum jelly for everyone!" and 'their motto.
(9) Senate, Consultations, XVI Leg., 31st Session, October 8, 2008, hearing Consob.
(10) In financial mathematics, and 'demonstrated that selling ensure gains in some rare instances where - due to shock market - short-term rates are more' higher than those with longer maturities' long. A yield curve of this kind and 'defined' inverse yield curve "or" negative yield curve. " [Cf. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/invertedyieldcurve.asp ]. In the past, and 'had a yield curve of this kind after the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers.
(11) v. JKGalbraith, The Great Crash, ch. III " In Goldman Sachs We Trust " (the title and 'clearly at odds with what notes written on the U.S. "In God We Trust ). [ http://books.google.it/books?id=l-xRKtKEpTwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=crash+galbraith ] In conclusion, much remains unclear, and rooted in time, the idea of \u200b\u200bWarren Buffet topic: " In God We Trust, all others pay cash . [ http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf ]
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